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ATTESTATION AUDITS REVISITED : HOW ABOUT PERFORMANCE 
AUDITS FOR PUBLIC COMPANIES?13 
By Haji Shall Mohamad 
UiTM Cawangan Sarawak, Samarahan Campus 
ABSTRACT 
The primary objective of this paper is to study the possibility of making 
performance audits mandatory initially at least for all publicly-listed companies. 
Auditing the performance of management and commenting on how 
economically, efficiently and effectively they have performed their duties is not 
a new subject. However, up until now the results of performance audits have 
usually been kept within the organization concerned ('in-house'). With the 
growth of perceived dissatisfaction with current auditing practices and the 
demand for more management accountability due to corporate collapses, this 
paper considers the possibility of performance audits being made mandatory. 
Problems to be overcome in establishing a performance audit framework include 
audit independence, cost/benefit decisions and the establishment of adequate 
measurement criteria. However, if the demands for performance audits escalate 
these problems will have to be overcome. Indeed they are not now seen as 
insurmountable. If the general public and the business community consider that 
this is the function they want an audit to perform in the future, for all entities 
both public and private, then performance auditing may acquire just as important 
a status as currently held by financial statements auditing. Therefore debate over 
the potential benefits of compulsory performance audits continues to increase. 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
External auditing is an important function in the business environment 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1983). Legislation exists in most Western countries to 
ensure that the function is mandatory for public companies (Arpan and 
Radebaugh, 1985). Even if auditing was not legislated for, Watts and 
Zimmerman argue that the function of external auditing would continue to exist, 
as it is an efficient method of reducing overall contract costs for an entity (ibid, 
p.633). The latter refers to all manner of costs likely to be incurred when 
transacting business with the particular entity concerned. 
External auditing serves many purposes. It can act to monitor the 
performance of management on behalf of shareholders or as a demonstration by 
management to existing and potential shareholders of their effort and 
performance. The former is usually referred to as the 'monitoring role' performed 
by external auditors while the latter purpose is referred to as the 'signaling role' 
performed by the independent external auditors. 
13
 A version of this paper was presented at the 4th Annual Conference of the Asian Academic Accounting 
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Herbert (1979:3) notes how traditionally, the purpose of accounts 
examination or auditing used to be to detect fraud and certify the accuracy of 
records, whereas the primary purpose now is to express an opinion on the truth 
and fairness of presentation of the financial statements. The latter role of 
auditing, also known as the 'attest function' is to simply add credence to the truth 
and fairness of the financial statements and to confirm that they comply in all 
material respects with the statutory requirements of any relevant legislation. 
2.0 EXTENSIONS TO THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL AUDITING 
To ensure that the actual audit performance corresponds more closely to 
expectations of the different user groups, Gwilliam (1987: 64) notes that the 
auditors' attestation role could be extended to include systems and performance 
auditing (encompassing the 'audit' of internal controls). 
A potential benefit from extending the scope of the statutory audit beyond 
the traditional attest function, into areas encompassing performance audits would 
be their role in narrowing what is commonly referred to in the audit literature as 
the Audit Expectation Gap (henceforth referred to as the "expectation gap"). The 
latter exists due to differences between the public's perceptions of the auditor's 
role and responsibilities and what auditors actually do in practice. Blair (1990) 
describes the expectation gap as the difference between what auditors do and 
what the users of audit reports think they receive. 
3.0 THE CONCEPT OF PERFORMANCE AUDITING 
Performance auditing, whereby auditors review and comment on internal 
controls, has become a topic of concern for auditors as a measure to be used in 
the pursuit of financial accountability. This type of auditing has come to be 
viewed by some, usually non-practitioners in the audit area, as a procedure that 
is complimentary to attest auditing. The realisation of the worth of performance 
auditing has encouraged both academics and practitioners to address it in a 
meaningful and concerted manner.14 
This begs the question, what is a performance audit and how does it differ 
from the conventional 'attest' audit? Gill and Cosserat (1996) define a 
performance audit as one which involves the process of obtaining and evaluating 
evidence about the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of an entity's operating 
activities in relation to specified objectives. This type of audit is also referred to 
as value-for-money (VFM) auditing, operational auditing, management auditing 
or efficiency auditing (ibid. p.5). 
14See for example Herbert (1979); Brown et al (1982); Parker (1986); Guthrie et al (1990) 
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In the literature, the above terms are often used interchangeably, to connote 
the same operation or activity. In fact, according to Parker (1986:11) they are to 
all intents and purposes identical in the prescription of their constituent elements, 
with all focusing upon the evaluation of economy, efficiency and effectiveness of 
resource utilisation, operation procedures and activities, and the pursuit of 
objectives. 
There was a spate of large corporate collapses and corporate scandals in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s in a number of Western countries. As mentioned by 
Godsell (1990) the demise of Estate Mortgage, Spedley Group, National Safety 
Council of Victoria and Tricontinental Corporation in Australia all resulted in 
legal proceedings against the audit firms involved. This in turn led to an increase 
in the demand for greater management accountability from some sectors of the 
business community. 
More recently the collapse of Barings Bank PLC in the United Kingdom in 
1995 brought into the limelight the question of auditor's responsibility to report 
publicly on the efficacy of internal controls. Sinha (1995) in his analysis of the 
Barings PLC collapse attributes it to the almost total failure of internal control 
mechanisms in place. 
In response to similar concerns in the United States, the American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) issued a white paper in June 1993 
which proposed that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) establish a 
reporting system requiring public companies to state whether the internal 
controls over their financial reporting were effective. Independent auditors 
would then be required to publicly comment on the validity of management's 
assertions. 
The motivation for this paper is derived from the perceived dissatisfaction 
which exists among some user groups of financial statements with certain 
aspects of current auditing practices. This dissatisfaction appears to have existed 
for some time. As far back as 1973, Beck (1973) surveyed two thousand 
shareholders selected at random from the share registers of two major Australian 
companies and found that a surprisingly large 81 % of the respondents thought an 
auditor's work assured them, that there was a basis for considering the entity 
audited to be financially sound. Another study by Steen (1989) in the United 
Kingdom found that 25% of a subset of participants described as influential 
believed that auditors guaranteed the financial soundness of the entity being 
audited. 
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Based on some of the above findings, it is quite obvious that an audit 
expectation gap appears to exist. As mentioned above, this is the difference 
between the role the audit profession perceives auditing plays in the business 
environment and the general public's perception of what function auditors 
currently serve. The expectation gap also incorporates the difference between 
auditor's current functions and functions the general public considers they 
should be performing. The expectation gap and the increase in litigation 
involving auditors referred to earlier, would taken together, suggest a level of 
dissatisfaction with certain aspects of the traditional external audit function. 
In light of this perceived dissatisfaction and the demand for more 
management accountability due to widespread corporate failures some of which 
were mentioned earlier, this paper looks at the possibility of extending the role 
of auditors beyond their traditional attest and statutory compliance functions to 
incorporate inter alia reporting on internal controls. In other words, this paper 
tries to explore the possibility of making performance audits mandatory, initially 
at least for publicly listed companies. 
O'Leary (1996) comments on how performance audits have traditionally 
been conducted by the internal audit departments of the entities under audit. The 
results of these audits have usually been kept very much "in-house". Internal 
auditors have been requested to review an area and report back to management 
on how economically, efficiently or effectively that area has been managed 
during the period under review. 
As the findings may not always be complimentary to management they 
have been reluctant to disclose them to the members of the entity or to the 
general public. 
Therefore, the important issues to be posed are: 
(i) Whether the users of the financial statements of the entity concerned 
would like to have this information, and 
(ii) Whether the members of the entity concerned are reasonably entitled 
to have access to information of this nature relating to the efficient and 
effective performance of the present management team. 
There are many potential problematic areas that will have to be tackled and 
overcome before a mandatory performance audit framework can be established. 
If however, the pressure for performance audits escalates, then ways will have to 
be found to overcome some of these potential problem areas. According to some 
writers like O'Leary (1996), these are not in fact insurmountable problems. 
This in turn leads to questions about the purpose of the audit function and 
further, about what is in store in the future. A review of the origins and history of 
auditing, as it is traditionally understood is therefore pertinent. 
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4.0 THE ORIGINS OF AUDITING 
Brown (1962) comments on how auditing can be traced back to the days 
of the Roman Empire. Similarly, Gill and Cosserat (1996) note that in ancient 
Egypt authorities provided for independent checks on the recording of tax 
receipts. In early Greece, inspections were made of the accounts of public 
officials, and the Romans compared disbursements with payment authorisations. 
Further, Gill and Cosserat (1996) note how the early records of auditing 
were primarily confined to public accounts, with those handling public monies 
required to attend before a responsible official known as the auditor who heard 
their accounting for such funds. The latter was similar to the approach taken by 
a judge hearing the evidence of witnesses at a trial. The word 'auditor' is derived 
from the Latin audire - 'to hear'. 
The authors also describe the practice of the government in medieval 
England of sending auditors on circuit to manors and estates to hear an 
accounting for disbursement and revenues. This practice contributed to the stable 
financial condition of the English Crown. 
Traditionally auditing only performed a stewardship function. It informed 
the members of an entity whether management of that entity, to whom they had 
entrusted their capital, had invested it as planned and could account for its 
current whereabouts. 
It is interesting to note that a statement of audit objectives published in a 
practice manual by Dicksee (1892) stated the object of an audit to be threefold: 
(i) the detection of fraud; 
(ii) the detection of technical errors; and 
(iii) the detection of errors of principle. 
Auditing practice evolved over time. In the early part of the twentieth 
century it was recognised that some reliance on internal control was possible. It 
now appears as if the practice of auditing has turned a complete cycle from its 
early beginnings. In what might be referred to as the formative days of auditing, 
it was popularly held that the chief objects of an audit were the detection and 
prevention of both fraud and errors, to the latter day view that the auditor was 
merely expressing an opinion and not certifying or guaranteeing the accuracy of 
the records (the latter is also known as the 'attest' role). 
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Today it appears that there is a move by some sectors for an extension to the 
traditional attest role to incorporate amongst other things, a performance audit 
with an auditor being required to express a public opinion on the efficacy or 
otherwise of a company's system of internal controls. 
As we are in the new millennium, the recipients of financial statements have 
become a far more sophisticated and informed group. They demand more from 
an audit function than a mere attestation that their investments can still be 
accounted for. Accounting standards have necessitated the issuance of a lot more 
than bare profit and loss and balance sheet figures. Significantly more additional 
data has to be given these days. Consider for instance, the voluminous notes, 
which, nowadays, accompany published financial statements. Items such as 
segment information, related party transactions and lease commitments to name 
but a few, are now part and parcel of the Annual Report of most entities. Auditors 
now have to comment on these data as well as the basic accounts. Hence auditing 
has expanded from its traditional stewardship role to one of a more informative 
nature as well. 
The brief history of auditing outlined earlier demonstrates an interesting point. 
Auditing is a profession and just like any other profession it is dynamic and not 
static. It will grow and adapt as the demands of the users of that profession 
change over time. According to O'Leary (1996) currently a level of 
dissatisfaction can be perceived worldwide, with what an audit function is seen 
to provide, and Malaysia is not immune to this global trend. This is due partly to 
the audit expectation gap referred to earlier. 
As reported in Gwilliam (1987) the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA) established the Cohen Commission in 1974 inter alia to 
consider whether a gap may exist between what the public expects or needs and 
what auditors can and should reasonably expect to accomplish. Gwilliam (1987) 
notes how in respect of its primary brief, the Commission came to the conclusion 
that such a gap does exist. 
However, the Commission noted that principal responsibility does not appear to 
lie with the users of financial statements. The Commission considered that the 
main reason for this "expectations gap" was the failure of the public accounting 
profession (or auditors) to react and evolve rapidly enough to keep pace with the 
speed of change in the business environment. 
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Blair (1990) further expands on the functions which an audit does not 
perform. He notes that an audit is not an assurance of the future viability of an 
entity. It is not an opinion on the economy, efficiency or effectiveness with which 
management has conducted its affairs, nor is it an assurance that there has been 
no fraud or other irregularity. His comment on management performance is 
interesting. Like many others, these comments appear to mirror some members 
of the public's expectations as to what an audit service should offer. 
Some users of accounts obviously feel that auditors should comment on 
management's performance for the period under review, as well as reporting on 
the accuracy of the financial statements of that entity. 
The audit expectation gap is, unfortunately, a current fact of life and while 
it exists, it will continue to cause criticism of and litigation against auditors, and 
to undermine confidence in their work. According to Porter (1991), if irreparable 
damage to the profession's reputation is to be prevented, the auditing profession 
must take urgent and effective action to narrow the gap. 
Porter (1991) notes how in recent years, the profession, particularly in 
Britain and the United States, has taken some positive steps to narrow the gap, 
but that these efforts have generally been fire-fighting in nature, targeted to quell 
the most vociferous and scathing criticism of auditors, or else they have been 
enforced by legislation and designed to serve specific objectives. 
5.0 LIMITATIONS AND PROBLEMS WITH IMPLEMENTING 
PERFORMANCE AUDITS 
From a review of the literature, it appears that there is a lack of support for 
recommendations that the auditors' traditional attestation role be extended to 
incorporate performance audits amongst other functions. Boys (1985), Santocki 
(1976), Edmonds (1983), Smith & Lanier (1970), and Smith et al (1972) 
discovered amongst other things that auditors were unwilling to perform such 
audits due to the wider responsibilities being undertaken. Gwilliam (1987) also 
attributed the reluctance to take on these additional tasks to the threat of greater 
legal exposure. 
There are many limitations and potential problematic areas that will have 
to be tackled and overcome before a mandatory performance audit framework 
can be established. O'Leary (1996) foresees three major problems which can 
arise as a result of attempting to implement performance audits on a mandatory 
basis. 
Briefly, some of the pitfalls include: 
(i) Loss of audit independence 
(ii) Cost/benefit considerations and 
(iii) The establishment of adequate measurement criteria. 
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5.1 Auditor independence 
As mentioned earlier, most large organizations currently conduct some 
form of performance auditing via their internal audit departments. Given their in-
depth knowledge of the entity which employs them, internal auditors are in the 
ideal position to comment on management's efficiency and effectiveness or 
otherwise. However, by definition, they cannot be expected to conduct the 
performance audit function with complete objectivity. Even if they could, the 
perception of independence would be extremely clouded. 
The ideal alternative is of course to utilize an entity's external auditors to 
conduct a performance audit, as well as the mandatory financial statements audit. 
Their knowledge of the client's operations will be reasonable but certainly not as 
thorough as that of the internal auditors. Hence if the external auditors perform 
the function, this raises the second problem, cost. 
5.2 Cost/Benefit 
Information always comes at a price. Whereas the shareholders of a 
company (or the members of any audited entity) and the general public would 
almost certainly welcome comments as to how economically, efficiently and 
effectively management of an entity has performed its functions, they will 
probably only welcome such additional information if it is obtainable at a 
reasonable price. Significant time, effort and resources would have to be 
employed in conducting any worthwhile performance audit. It would be expected 
that management would wish to recoup these costs from shareholders, be it by 
way of additional contribution or reduced returns (dividend payments, etc). This 
would appear reasonable as shareholders would be the major beneficiaries of the 
additional review function, i.e. the performance audit. 
As mentioned in Gwilliam (1987), a general problem which arises when 
considering the possibility of such extensions to the traditional audit role, lies in 
the lack of evidence as to the potential costs and benefits. The fact that there is 
generally no prohibition upon many of these services being offered and 
purchased at present seems to suggest a priori that in the majority of instances, 
the costs currently exceed the benefits. 
5.3 Establishing measurement criteria 
One of the major difficulties with performance audits is how to establish 
measurement criteria. Commenting on what is economic, efficient and effective 
is obviously not as clear-cut as commenting on dollar and cent valuations and 
results. Performance evaluations may be highly subjective unless adequate 
guidelines are set against which performances can be gauged. It is critical 
therefore in a performance audit that the audit objective be properly defined so 
that the results of the investigation can be assessed correctly. However, setting 
the objective for a performance audit as opposed to a financial statements audit 
will not usually be as straightforward. This is due to the lack of a succinct 
meaning for the terms economic, efficient and effective. 
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6.0 COMMENTS 
The above three difficulties may partly explain why the concept of issuing 
the results of performance audits to outside parties has not yet been embraced 
readily by some elements of the financial community. However, these problems 
are not insurmountable. The difficulty of a lack of independence can easily be 
overcome by having the performance audits conducted by external audit firms, 
and this may not necessarily result in exorbitant costs which have to be passed 
on to the members of the entity. The external auditors must already possess a 
sound knowledge of their clients' operations. 
The work carried out by Boys (1985) in the United Kingdom found that 
there was already a very considerable overlap between performance auditing and 
the work of the management consultancy divisions of professional accounting 
firms. Hence the finding that accounting firms were much more prepared to 
countenance the auditor in this additional role, since the extra costs if any, were 
likely to be marginal. When carrying out the audit of financial statements, the 
external auditors usually review several aspects of management performance. 
For instance the auditor should obtain an understanding of the internal control 
structure in order to plan the audit and develop an effective audit approach. This 
means that the auditors are bound to review and assess the effect of the internal 
controls on the entity. The by-product of this function is often seen in the letter 
of recommendation. Arens et al (1990) comments that a secondary purpose of 
many financial statement audits is to also make operational recommendations to 
management. 
Costs can further be reduced by the external auditors assessing the 
workings of the audit entity's own internal audit department. If they are satisfied 
that this department is competent and acts independently of management 
pressure, they are entitled to rely on their work to a large extent. 
If this is allowable for a financial statement audit, why not for a 
performance audit as well? Relying on the performance audit work of the 
internal audit department would greatly reduce the cost to the external auditors 
of performing an independent review. Hence, it may be quite feasible to have 
external auditors conduct performance audits without the costs becoming too 
prohibitive. 
This then leaves us with just the problem of establishing adequate 
measurement criteria. Here again, however, significant progress has already been 
achieved. In the United States, Charnes and Cooper (1980) attempted to develop 
a method of evaluating management efficiency which did not necessitate the use 
of imputed market prices. Their new method uses complex linear programming 
techniques. 
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Sherman (1984) then compared the performance of these techniques, 
which he termed 'data envelopment analysis' (DEA), with the techniques of 
financial ratio analysis and analytical review which are traditionally employed 
by auditors as part of their performance audits. He found DEA better able to 
capture efficiency dimensions not covered by the more traditional methods of 
evaluation. Sherman suggests two valid reasons for the use of DEA techniques. 
Firstly DEA can provide technical measures of efficiency, thereby 
abstracting from all the problems associated with internal cost allocations (this 
also includes those situations where market imperfections allow for high 
profitability in spite of operating inefficiencies) and secondly, it is better able to 
account for expenditures such as training, research and development, etc which 
contribute to future output but are not taken into account in arriving at more 
current measures of profitability. 
Therefore the gist of the arguments against mandatory performance audits 
as well as their proposed remedies can be summarized briefly in the table below 
as follows: 
Figure 1 : Implementation of mandatory performance audit 
(problems / solutions) 
1 
2 
3 
Problems 
Loss of audit 
independence 
Cost/Benefit 
Establishing adequate 
measurement criteria 
Proposed Solutions 
• Require external auditors to carry out 
performance audits 
• Reduce costs by accessing the resources of 
the in-house Internal Audit Department 
• Using linear programming techniques 
termed data envelopment analysis (DEA) 
• Redefinition of the measurement criteria 
In some countries like Australia the fact that the audit practice statement 
AUP 33 (and the subsequent AUS 806) has already been in issue since 1992 
indicates that a fairly high degree of agreement already exists as to what the 
measurement criteria entail. The three critical words in performance auditing, 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness are well defined therein. While they are 
still prone to a certain degree of subjectivity in their implementation, they are 
certainly not as nebulous as some commentators would have us believe. With 
time the measurement criteria can be refined and re-defined if necessary. 
Hence the problems associated with performance auditing should not be 
considered insurmountable. With careful planning, monitoring and 
implementation, they can be overcome. 
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7.0 CONCLUSION 
The issue of the audit practice statement AUP 33 in 1992 heralded the 
official recognition of performance auditing by the auditing profession in 
Australia. Certain members of the business community and some academics 
believe it to be the future of auditing worldwide. Rather than just the traditional 
financial statement audit, in years to come audit firms may have to comment on 
management performance as well as the accounts under review, in conducting 
their periodic reviews of audit entities. 
Questionnaire studies and other evidence suggest that user groups see the 
auditor as performing a wider function than that encompassed by the presently 
limited scope of the financial audit. A number of possible changes in, and 
extensions to, the audit function have been suggested so as to ensure that the 
actual audit performance corresponds more closely to the expectations of various 
user groups. Research work relating to this problem of the audit expectation gap 
and some suggested solutions has been reviewed earlier. 
Smith et al (1972) who undertook a survey into the need for and scope of 
the audit of management's performance, concluded from their study that because 
of management's relationship to the rest of society, the question of need is 
academic, maintaining that there is a very clear need and that the remaining 
important issues only revolve around the questions of scope and appropriate 
professional standards. 
It must be borne in mind in relation to the latter, that their comments were 
made almost a quarter of a century ago. The latter would no longer appear to be 
an important issue since professional standards covering the area of performance 
auditing have already been in issue in Australia since 1992 and it is only a matter 
of time before other countries in the region follow suit. 
Similarly, Beck (1973) performed an empirical appraisal looking at the role 
of the auditor in modern society and made the following observations: 
If the ascribed role is not fully performed .... there arises the possibility 
that social action will be taken to enforce conformity (perhaps by new 
legislation or to downgrade the status and thus shrink the role. As a role 
develops only out of social wants, it is axiomatic that the void created by a 
reduced role will, in due course, be filled by other social functionaries 
prepared to satisfy those social wants, (p. 118) 
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He then goes further, noting that: 
It may be doubtful whether any other credible source can provide 
information of this kind: but auditors certainly should be aware that it is wanted 
and that a significant proportion of shareholders expect auditors to supply it 
(p.121). 
Porter (1991) concludes from her research investigating the structure and 
composition of the audit expectation gap that auditors are failing to meet 
society's expectations in relation to their corporate watchdog function. The 
auditing profession has usually downplayed the latter role, yet survey results 
consistently demonstrate that auditors' stakeholders expect auditors to perform 
these additional duties. 
These concerns of both Beck and Porter amongst others have been borne 
out in recent years by the additional responsibilities imposed on auditors in many 
parts of the English-speaking world through legislation. 
Much of the information presented in corporate annual reports which is 
generally not covered by the external auditor's opinion is important for making 
sound investment decisions. The purpose of this paper therefore, has been to 
consider whether the external auditor's attest function should be extended by 
mandate to incorporate performance auditing. Probably the only significant 
barriers at the present time to extending the attest function to include information 
outside the financial statements are the economic and legal implications of any 
such proposed extension. 
Perhaps recent developments, such as the clarification of legal 
responsibilities and the development of accounting standards and procedures 
which lessen time and cost limitations, will lessen the effect of these obstacles. 
External auditors should seize this opportunity to extend their services to 
society wherever desirable and feasible. Failure to do so promptly may well have 
the undesirable consequence of weakening their claims to being the principal 
attester in our contemporary society. 
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Mautz and Sharaf (1961) presented the challenge confronting the 
profession very clearly, noting as follows : 
As the public requires more and more verified information, much of it well 
beyond that currently found in financial statements, will auditing see and 
seize the opportunity to extend its range of service? If it does, there are 
literally no bounds to its future. If on the other hand, it either deliberately 
or unconsciously limits itself to but a small fraction of the total of 
verifiable information, its position of eminence may be lost to those who 
do seize the larger opportunity. (p.200) 
Although these observations were made more than forty years ago, there 
seems to be a ringing truth to their predictions in light of the current 
controversies surrounding the suggestions made about the extension of the 
auditor's role to incorporate mandatory performance auditing. 
If the general public and the business community consider that this is the 
function they want an audit to perform in the future, for all entities both public 
and private, then performance auditing may acquire just as important a status as 
financial statement auditing currently holds. Therefore debate over the potential 
benefits of compulsory performance audits continues to increase both in 
Malaysia and overseas. 
In conclusion, irrespective of whatever role the audit profession wishes to 
ascribe to auditors, in the long run the public will shall be expected to prevail. 
The profession of auditors must be seen to possess considerable economic 
power, albeit indirectly, for in the absence of a functioning auditing profession 
the economic structure in most English-speaking countries will be different and 
corporate organisations as we understand it will disappear. The following 
comments attributed to Berle (1960) apply no less to auditors: 'we have 
considered public consensus, if not as originator, certainly as final arbiter of 
legitimacy' (p.111). 
It seems reasonable to view the public consensus concerning the role of 
auditor as in a state of continuous change or development, but generally 
speaking, there is a small likelihood of sudden or dramatic change in this 
consensus. Although these last comments were made as the result of a study 
undertaken by Beck in Australia almost three decades ago, it is suggested here 
that they are still valid and can be taken as reflecting the extant role of the 
auditor. 
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